Caste And Hinduism

By Gail Omvedt
Economic and Political Weekly
29 November, 2003
M V Nadkarni's recent article "Is Caste System Intrinsic to Hinduism?:
Demolishing a Myth", (EPW, November 8, 2003) comes as a follow-up to his
earlier article "Ethics and Relevance of Conversions: A Critical
Assessment of Religious and Social Dimensions in a Gandhian Perspective"
(Januay 18). Both articles show the fundamental stamp of Hindutva
ideology, primary of which is shoddy methodology, selective quotation (for
example, his references to my work are to a 10-year old book and
selectively at that), and illogic.
The illogic in the 'Caste System' article begins with a basic, unexamined
premise: that there is some entity called 'Hinduism', a religion which has
lasted 4,000 years and which comprehends 'classical' as well as 'medieval'
and 'modern' forms. This is the most historically unjustified premise,
since the term 'Hindu' to refer to a religious belief was never used until
the establishment of Muslim regimes (and then only in some parts of India;
for instance, Tukaram - who Nadkarni takes as one of the 'Hindu' bhakti
sants, never in all his 4,700 abhangs used this word) and it never came
into generalised use throughout India until the 19th century. This has
been documented by numerous scholars and I will not cite them here. The
illogic is that Nadkarni assumes, and documents, changes in the caste as a
socio-historical structure (which I think is correct) but does not
question the supposedly unchanging character of an essential 'Hinduism'.
(Incidentally, Nadkarni is silent on whether Buddhism, Jainism and the
shramanic traditions should be considered as part of 'Hinduism').
Other mistakes pale before this basic point, but I will take up a few
issues.
First, he says that Ambedkar regards the Purush Sukta as an interpolation.
This is an opinion of many Sanskrit scholars, not only Ambedkar. That
different texts ('religious' or not) contain material from different
periods is a historical inevitability; looking at the text within the
framework of the social and material conditions of its time, determining
its time, is a major part of a scholarís task. The Purush Sukta, to my
knowledge, is taken to be a very late addition (whether we use the term
'interpolation' is a matter of definition) to the rest of the Rig Veda.
The dating of the Rig Veda (by most scholars to 1,500-1,000 BC) itself
does not justify the '4,000 year' claim. I have argued in my own recent
book, Buddhism in India: Challenging Brahmanism and Caste (Sage India,
2003) that caste ('varnashrama dharma') emerged as a concept only in the
middle of the first millennium BCE - not at first as an actual social
structure but as an emerging prescription of what an ideal social
structure should be. For about a millennium there was a battle between the
brahmanic tradition (supporting varnashrama dharma) and the shramanic
traditions, especially Buddhism, over the nature of what society should
be. It is relatively meaningless to use the actual social situation in
this period as justifying what Nadkarni calls 'Hinduism' but what de facto
he takes as only the brahmanic scriptures.
A major problem of interpretation comes up as to whether the Gita's
justification of assigning varna categories is by birth or by 'merit'.
Nadkarni argues for merit as do all modern ideologies of Hindutva, as for
that matter Gandhi did at least at the end of his life. (Gandhi did
support 'swadharma', following the profession of oneís father, for a
lengthy period, but leave that aside). I do not think this is what the
ancient texts meant - but even if they did, the point remains that it is
profoundly undemocratic to assign people, at whatever age, to certain
tasks and responsibilities and rights according to some form of presumed
'merit' or 'guna' and then to treat them differentially. Could any
democratic society legislate that people who are primarily workers should
not be able to read or should not be able to read certain valued religious
texts and that they should be punished if they did so? Could any
democratic society legislate that people who are not primarily (by 'merit'
or not) something called 'brahmans' should be forbidden from teaching or
arguing about such texts? Varna by merit is as abominable a conception as
varna by birth. (Nadkarni does not of course mention women, because here
it is almost impossible to sustain any argument.)
Incidentally, the sections of the Gita that Nadkarni quotes (IV:13, II:31,
XVIII: 47) are not necessarily the most pro-varna, according to my
reading. I would refer to the entire sequence of XVIII: 41-47. Even worse
are the verses in I: 40-47, which state that varnasamkarna (mixture of
varnas) leads to destruction of the family and both lead to hell. It seems
to me that such verses cannot be 'explained away'; one must say whether
one agrees or disagrees with them. Nadkarni would apparently 'disagree'
with such sentiments of the brahmanic 'canon' - but why are there so many
of them and why are they so persistent?
How much of the Gita is left that cannot be found in the Dhammapada, or in
Samkhya philosophy? Why should the Gita be considered a particularly holy
book? And if not the Gita, which are the texts Nadkarni would recommend?
To take up the issue of bhakti as Nadkarni calls 'the most prominent
movement within the framework of Hinduism to fight against casteism'.
Again, we have to be on guard against the tendency to classify all bhakta
sants as within the same system, the same religion, the same framework.
There were orthodox institutionalised sects, many of which controlled a
good deal of money and power - the Vallabhaites in north India, the
Ramdasis in Maharashtra, to take two exmaples. Those whom I have been
calling the radical bhakta sants ñ Kabir, Ravidas, Mira, and in
Maharashtra Tukaram, Cokhamela, Namdev, Dnandev - were quite different.
Kabir clearly differentiated himself from both ëHindusí and 'Muslims'
(whom he usually called 'Turks'); so did Nanak, though Nadkarni does not
apparently consider him a part of 'Hinduism'. Tuka spoke primarily in
terms of Vithoba or Vitthal, but when he used the term 'Vishnudas' or
ëVaishnava virí for the varkaris, he used it in such a way as to include
many Muslims and to exclude pandits, followers of brahmanic rituals, and
advaita philosophy. Numerous abhangs take dharma and karma as referring to
'the others' and not to the varkaris. The fact is that Cokhamela died
young while carrying out his caste duty, which he could not escape; Tukaís
manuscripts were drowned because as a shudra he was not supposed to write or teach, and there is good evidence that in the end he was murdered by
his orthodox opponents.1
The opposition to caste, untouchability, panditry, etc, by the radical
sants cannot be taken as a 'proof' of the progressive and reform qualities
of something called 'Hinduism'. Coming to the 'modern' period, Nadkarni
makes a serious error when he takes ezhavas and nadars as examples of
dalits who have raised their status by reformist policies. Ezhavas (also
known as tiyyas) and nadars were never untouchables in the sense that
pulayas and cherumans in Kerala, or paraiyas and pallars in Tamil Nadu.
They were lower OBCs. And while many among them have benefited by modern changes, it is still apparently true that as social groups, that is, they
remain in the same place in the hierarchy as before - that is, above the
scheduled castes, and below the upper shudras and twice-born categories.
Finally, the point is not whether caste is dying away or not. Certainly it
can survive only with difficulty in a modern democratic age and, as a
historical form that came into existence at a certain time it is also
certain to vanish. At the same time it is clear that forms, or 'remnants'
or whatever Nadkarni or others would like to call them - he prefers terms
such as 'caste identities' and 'ghosts' implying lack of material reality
- remains. What is his position regarding these remnants or surviving
forms? Does he agree or not that programmes of affirmative action are
still needed in the economic sphere? Does he agree or not that the
continuing domination of a hereditary brahman priesthood in most 'Hindu'
temples - and especially in the very lucrative ones - is wrong and should
be abolished? In his January 18 article Nadkarni has justified opposition
to conversion with particular citations from Gandhi. There may be plenty
of reason to argue against conversion. This does not justify any law
banning it or discriminating against people who 'convert' (who choose to
follow a particular religion or a particular sect within a religion). Laws
may ban only those practices which infringe on the rights of others,
otherwise propagation of a religious point of view - just as propagation
of a political point of view - is a fundamental right.
Nadkarni has written that within Islam and Christianity there are
retrogressive as well as progressive and democratic tendencies. This is
true, and I (and most others) would support the democratic tradition
within these religions - and oppose retrogressive ones. I do not consider
'Hinduism' to be a religion in the same sense, but I would certainly
support Nadkarniís right to call himself a religious 'Hindu'. The rest
depends on what kind of stand he takes within what he considers to be
Hinduism: would he support affirmative action or diversity programmes at
all levels? Would he support the removal of hereditary priesthood from
temples? Would he support the right of people to choose which faith to
follow? I await his answer.
Time will submit to slavery
from illusionís bonds we'll be free
everyone will be
powerful and prosperous -
Brahman, Ksatriya, Vaishya, Shudra
and Chandala all have rights
women, children, male and female
and even prostitutes
-Tuka (Tukaram), 17th century Marathi Sant of India
Note
1 See the ongoing translations of Tuka which have been done by Bharat
Patankar and the author; for an early publication see 'Says Tuka .Songs of
a Radical Bhakta', Critical Asian Studies 35, 2, June 2003 (translations
from the Marathi with introduction).


http://www.countercurrents.org/dalit-omvedt291103.htm

'A positive secularism should be based not on Gandhi and Nehru but on Phule, Ambedkar and Periyar'

Sociologist Dr. Gail Omvedt, emails answers to BIJURAJ's queries on Mayawati, dalit movements, Hindutva and the modern-day communists. What is the position of Dalits now in general? Is theirs a story of progress or setbacks? I think there are many instances of progress. One of these is Mayawati’s victory. Questions could be raised about her strategy but there is little doubt she has electrified dalits all over India and sent a scare to Congress and other parties in the establishment. This carries a speck of dalit movement in politics, and it should not be ignored. A dalit woman as CM, in striking distance of becoming the PM, is a major achievement. But there are also many negatives too. Many activists may feel the need of ‘Shudra’ or a ‘Bahujan’ alliance, a dalit-non Brahman alliance, to annihilate caste. But this alliance appears to be in tatters today. The mental backwardness of the backward castes, their ongoing mental slavery to Brahmanism, remains a problem, illustrated by Khairlanji and numerous other atrocities. Unless this is overcome, there can be no real victory. The UP majority was possible because of the particular caste equations there – 20% SCs, 12% Brahmans, 12% Thakurs. This is true of much of the “Chamar” belt, and so BSP’s strategy makes sense. But the same strategy cannot work elsewhere. There are also differences within the Dalit castes. The Mala-Madiga conflict has become so severe in Andhra that some Madigas are demanding that Malas be taken off the reserved list. Similar splits can be seen elsewhere, for example among Matangs and Buddhists in Maharashtra. Nor is there any sense of a Dalit unity in regard to demands to include Dalit Christians and Dalit Muslims in the reserved list. While the courts are barring additional reserved seats, the response of many dalit organizations has been entirely negative. There is the need for a sense of solidarity.  There is the other side to Mayawati’s victory: corruption, nepotism, opportunistic alliance. Also ‘sarvajan samaj’, her controversial slogan. Politics is a dirty game; I don’t think she is more corrupt than any of the other political leaders. When Babasaheb said that dalits should become a ruling community, he meant that they should not simply take up their own demands but keep the interests of the entire society in mind. He continually stressed the harm that the caste system has done in terms of not just oppressing the subalterns, but in ruining the entire society. In this sense, Dalits can and do represent the “sarvajan.” It also has to be remembered that a political party does not represent a section of the society but should set the agenda for entire country. The call for a “sarvajan samaj” is part of an effort to mainstream the BSP. I, for one, would be delighted if the BSP could emerge as the real alternative to Congress, not just as a party protesting for the dalits. BSP used Hindu upper caste symbols and depictions for its election campaign.  Yes, but Dalits also need to use the symbols. They could point out that “Naga” was also a word for elephant in the Pali literature (see the Dhammapada) and that Buddha was called “mahanag.” “Hathi naahi Ganesh hai…” Ganesh is, originally, a non Aryan deity. It can be used to symbolise the original casteless, classless society— ganvyavastha din, gan pati as “the people as ruler.” How can the caste system be annihilated? How do you go about it, politically? Babasaheb Ambedkar had given two methods in his essay on the subject. One is inter-caste marriage. Once this has gone far enough castes are rendered meaningless. He also argued that it is necessary to renounce Brahmanic Hinduism. Become a Buddhist, Christian, Sikh or a Muslim but renounce the shastras. I’m not sure if it is enough to be an atheist since Brahmanism has been effective in absorbing atheism. Sociologically speaking, atheism does not provide the kind of family support that is necessary. People go back to old ways. Of course, it may be argued that Brahmanism also absorbs and co-opts Buddhism and Christianity. But when the majority of the country is consciously non Hindu, we will see a different picture. This has to begin from within the political sphere. There should be an end to Brahmanic Hinduism practised in schools, appearing in texts, and in subtle and not-so-subtle ways. Policies of affirmative action are needed to break the historical links of caste and economic occupation and position, to bring the people on an equal footing. This should apply to the defence, science and the corporate sector. I don’t think changing names makes much difference. My analogy is “Harry Potter”. These English names bear the imprint of old occupations, but nobody takes them seriously anymore. In American culture and, to some extent, the English culture people take pride in having ancestors who were working class. We rose by our own efforts, they say. This is not true in India, where people prefer royal or Brahmanic ancestors! How are the Sangh Parivar and fundamentalism faring at the moment? I think they have had setbacks, but unless there is some positive response these could be only temporary. The problem is that the Hindutva feeds on the disgust people have with the Congress; and the “soft saffron” position adopted by so many Congressmen. So as long as Congress remains what it is, and there is no real alternative party, the opposition BJP and the Parivar will benefit. The basic problem here is that we cannot really distinguish between “Hinduism” and “Hindutva,” Why, for instance, was it the land of Gandhi, Gujarat, which had the pogroms? My disillusionment with Gandhi really climaxed then. And in this sense Congress is the child of Gandhi, more than of the so-called “secular” Nehru. A positive secularism has to be fostered, based not on Gandhi and Nehru but on Phule, Ambedkar, Periyar and other dalit-bahujan intellectuals. Do you believe that the dalit movements have nothing to draw from Gandhi's legacy? Was Gandhi’s role totally against Dalits? Yes, almost entirely. It is a fact that Gandhi was the first major opponent of Ambedkar. After the round table on the issue of separate electorates, and when Ambedkar announced his conversion, it was Gandhi who was his most vocal opponent. The Hindu Mahasabhba accepted his conversion to Buddhism. One of the serious criticisms against Dr. Ambedkar is that he didn’t take the Freedom Movement seriously. His priority lay in the uprooting of the caste system.  Without annihilation of the caste system there is no real freedom.  Is there a place for nationality, language and culture in caste movements? Do you think that dalits should go back to own culture to find the basis for emancipation? What has to be remembered is that local cultures and languages are so heavily colonised by Brahmanism that it is hard for dalits to find their own traditions. Caste discouraged change and innovation, forced people to remain in their place. Of course there are positive elements, the histories of rebellion and dissent, but these have to be recovered from brahmanic cooption. For example, in Maharashtra the varkari movement— with Namdeo, Cokhamela, Tukaram and the like—symbolized a revolt against caste, but much of this has been lost to history. The temple remains controlled by Brahmans. In Karnataka, the Lingayat movement began with Basava’s revolt against ritualism, polytheism and caste, symbolised by an inter-caste marriage that led to a state repression and a popular revolt. But now the situation is such that when a writer proposes that Basava may have been a dalit, he is met by strong protest. Thus the traditions have to be fought for. This can be done, I think, only with the help of a universalistic culture: dalits need to use the world as their stage; learn computers, English – all of which are necessary to transform the local cultures. What is your view on the Communists and the Left in India?  They are hardly communists. I don’t know if they even read much of Marx any more. Their protest against globalisation, for example, had tended to seek solace in the old state capitalist societies, looking to the nation as an alternative to a global order. I remember their predictions about globalisation in 1991 – that the Indian capitalists would be “eaten up” by international imperialism, there would be overwhelming price rise and so on. This, of course, has not happened. Indian capitalists are doing quite well, though inequalities have increased. They have failed to focus on the real problems of globalisation, the way old imperialism based on the competition of dominant nation-states with their colonies, has transformed itself into Empire (in the words of Antonio Negri), and is taking on new forms of integration, developing new methods of production. We have to go forward, not backwards. They seem to waver between simply accepting all the multinationals and investment – leading to Nandigrams – and holding to the old forms of state capitalism, in which a Brahman-controlled public sector was perceived to be socialistic. And there is no evidence that they have really changed their old positions on Ambedkar, dalits, caste and gender. Should caste struggles be violent or non violent? Whether a struggle is nonviolent or violent depends on the response of the class/caste enemy, and what people are ready for. Switching to violence when there are opportunities for peaceful mass struggle and parliamentary politics doesn’t work, I think – except in backward societies such as Nepal.  Once we saw an active Dalit Panther movement. Any lessons to be learnt there? We can say that the Dalit Panthers were an immature though militant and energetic movement. They were not organised enough; they very quickly broke up into factions. They represented the aspirations of the period but had no real strategy. Afterwards, the youth from those Mumbai slums said, “We didn’t know what was in the manifesto. All we knew was that if someone put his hand on your sister, it was to be cut off!”

Posted on Sep 12, 2008
at http://www.tehelka.com/story_main40.asp?filename=Ws200908positive_secularism.asp

Questions of name

Dalit”, “Scheduled Caste”, “Ex-Untouchable” and “Harijan”. These are only some of the many words used to refer to the most oppressed sections of Indian society, “untouchable” in the traditional caste order, performers of the most degrading task, and still today caught in the throes of poverty, discrimination and the remnants of untouchability.

“Dalit” is still probably the most widespread of these terms, but it is not uncontested. Many are uncomfortable with its apparent militancy. It means literally “crushed” or “ground down”, and it has an interesting history. It is first found, apparently, in the ’30s, when it was used as a Marathi and Hindi translation for the British term “Depressed Classes.” (As elsewhere, “classes” here meant “castes”, something to remember when we are discussing OBCs.) Ambedkar used it in this way to refer to his Depressed Class conferences, though in English we most often find him using the simple and descriptive term “Untouchable”. His conflicts with Gandhi in the early ’30s were at least partly a matter of terminology. Gandhi had, for him, the brilliant idea of using the term “Harijan”, taken from the bhakti movement. Ambedkar resisted this, just as he resisted Gandhi’s attempt to turn an Untouchable League (which Ambedkar thought should take up general issues of civil rights) into a paternalistic organisation controlled by upper-caste Hindus. Ambedkar, and militant Dalits ever since, have seen the word “Harijan” as demeaning and false, hence oppressive.

Then, in the early ’70s, “Dalit” became a symbol  of the new militant movement of the oppressed, with the formation of the Dalit Panthers in Maharashtra, the Dalit Sangharsh Samiti in Karnataka, and many others. These groups became involved in struggles against atrocities, sometimes in open and violent clashes with caste Hindus. The word echoed in numerous slum and village-based groups that emerged during that period. Its militancy, its open proclamation of oppression, attracted youth restless under the scorn of the so-called “upper” castes, ready to fight. It became generalised, and used even in newspaper reports. It is, after all, a more colourful expression than the cold and official sounding “Scheduled Caste”. And, the Dalit Panther manifesto proclaimed that “Dalit” meant “all oppressed”, including workers and poor peasants. It seemed a fitting term for the new era of assertion of the various “new social movements” of the ’70s and ’80s.

Yet the use of “Dalit” has not gone uncontested. For one, Kanshi Ram rejected it when he formed his Bahujan Samaj Party, though he earlier had used it with DS-4, the Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangh, as a militant organisation. For his political party, however, he wanted to formulate a wider appeal, and though the Dalit Panthers had given a broad meaning to the term, still it had come to be used in practice only for the Scheduled Castes. “Bahujan”, meaning literally “majority” (and with some echoes from Buddhism, bahujan hitaya, bahujan sukaya), was meant to be used for SCs, STs, OBCs and minorities. Thus, in all his various disputes with other parties (in particular the Republican Parties based mainly in Maharashtra), Kanshi Ram insisted that his was not in fact only a “Dalit” party.

Some of the more militant Buddhists don’t like the term. Yashwant Manohar, a writer from Maharashtra, said once, “Call me Buddhist, call me Mahar, call me Naga, anything but Dalit!” It was its negative connotations that were rejected. Many of these Dalits wanted a broader, more positive identity, that moved beyond tradition; for this reason some have adopted the term “Buddhist” in preference to any word implying a caste identification.

Today, in addition, with many disputes arising among the various castes of ex-Untouchables, and with the formerly “weaker” SCs asserting themselves in new ways, it seems clear that an all-embracing “Dalit” identity is being rejected by many. The pendulum seems to be swinging back to a caste identification. The conflict between the Malas and Madigas in Andhra is only the most stark example, but similar tensions are seen in north India, between the large and powerful Chamar group and slightly smaller (but still very widespread) castes such as the Valmikis, and in Maharashtra between Mahars and Matangas. In Tamil Nadu, the former Pallars began asserting themselves as DKVs, “Devendra Kula Vanniyars”. “Is Dalit unity possible?” has become an important question and it is quite likely that most of the former Untouchables would simply identify themselves by their caste names.

It is difficult to predict the future, but “Harijan” definitely seems to be out for the conscious and assertive youth, while the ambiguity about caste identities and an all-embracing “Dalit” identity remains. “Dalit” remains the most useful inclusive term and — strikingly — in some ways the least controversial.

Changing terminology should surprise no one. In the US, the oppressed group once known as “Negroes” or “Coloured People” (remember the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, founded by none other than the militant W.E.B. Du Bois) moved to a preference for “Black” in the ’60s and ’70s, to the less colour-conscious, more ethnic oriented “African-American” today. Mobile social groups, finally, chose their own identities, and that is what the former Untouchables, the Dalits, the oppressed sections of India, will do.

Gail Omvedt, a sociologist, has written a biography of Ambedkar express@expressindia.com

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/questions-of-name/338487/3